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We use a unique hand collected data set of 6 258 auctions from the online football manager 
game Hattrick to study micro-patterns of reserve price formation. We find that chosen reserve 
prices exhibit both, very sophisticated and “irrational” behavior by the sellers. Reserve prices 
pick up the “birthday effect” in sales prices, documented in Englmaier and Schmöller (2008) 
and are adjusted remarkably nuanced to the resulting sales price pattern. Moreover, reserve 
prices are too clustered (around multiples of €50 000) as to be consistent with fully rational 
behavior. Furthermore, we find evidence for entitlement effects and the sunk cost fallacy as 
there is a huge positive effect on the reserve price when the player has been acquired 
previously. 
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Auctions have been an important allocation mechanism for a long time. Though not all
applications of auctions have been as extraordinary as the legendary auction that occurred in
the year 193 A.D. when the entire Roman Empire was auctioned o® by the Praetorian Guard
to the highest bidder Didius Julianus, they are used in a wide array of ¯elds like art sale, real
estate, or spectrum rights. With the ascent of the internet, auctions have exceedingly gained
popularity on platforms such as eBay.com, amazon.com, or eBid.com. It is therefore hardly
surprising that the ¯eld has been studied extensively by many economists. One example is
Lucking-Reiley (2000) who presents data from a comprehensive study of 142 di®erent internet
auction sites. His results describe the transaction volumes, the types of auction mechanisms
used, the types of goods auctioned, and the business models employed at the various sites.
From his results it is obvious that an important strategic design element in most auction
environments is the reserve or minimum price that can be set by the seller. From the classic
contributions in auction theory, Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981), or Bulow
and Roberts (1989), we have a fairly clear picture about how optimal reserve prices should
look - they do not depend on the number of bidders and they are a continuous function of
the hazard rate of the distribution of valuations of buyers.1 Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2007)
extend the analysis to non-standard reference point dependent preferences and show whether
and how reserve prices perceived as reference points a®ect bidding behavior.
However, while there is considerable (although con°icting) empirical evidence on the e®ect
of reserve prices on bidding behavior, there is little empirical evidence on how sellers actually
set reserve prices. Using a hand collected data set of 6 258 auctions of virtual football players
traded in English auctions on hattrick.org we are able to approach this question and provide
micro evidence on individual sellers' reserve price choices.2 The online game Hattrick (HT)
is the world's largest online football manager game with almost one million participants and
every day about forty thousand virtual players are traded on the HT transfer market. By
design, these trades take place in a highly controlled environment including a standardized
duration for each auction, a ¯xed mode of how players on sale are presented, and no risk of
default. Sellers are however free to choose a non-negative reserve price (public minimum bid).
Moreover, unlike many other online auction platforms, in HT there is no relation between
the minimum bid and the transaction fees a seller is charged, which could bias individuals in
their optimal choice of a reserve price. We ¯nd both evidence for very sophisticated behavior
and boundedly rational behavior in the reserve price patterns in our data.
1Note however that these predictions are derived in independent private value environments. In interde-
pendent value environments a±liated or common values there are few general results to be found.
2Data on auctions of virtual football players traded on hattrick.org have been used previously in studies
by Trautmann and Traxler (2008) and by Englmaier and SchmÄ oller (2008).
1On the one hand, we ¯nd strong evidence that sellers take into account the \birthday
e®ect" as documented in Englmaier and SchmÄ oller (2008). A player's value in the game
decreases, ceteris paribus, continuously with his age measured in days as it becomes harder
and harder to improve his skills by training. In Englmaier and SchmÄ oller (2008) we show
a very strong drop in sales prices just on a player's birthday, indicating that buyers in HT
overweigh the age of a player measured in years as opposed to his age measured in days,
though the latter is also plainly visible to all buyers free of cost as can be seen in Figure
5 in the appendix. Our analysis of sellers' reserve price formation patterns clearly shows
that the birthday e®ect is also present with respect to reserve prices. Further examination
of the data indicates that this is the case not (only) because sellers fall prey to the same
information under-usage fallacy as the buyers but because (at least a substantial fraction of)
sellers tries to strategically exploit this irrational behavior of the demand side. We ¯nd a
clustering of sale o®ers just before players' birthdays, indicating that sellers rationally want
to sell players before they drop in value on their birthday. Furthermore, for the same time
a spike in the number of unsold players indicates comparably aggressive reserve prices for
these players. Finally, a sharp drop of median reserve prices immediately before the birthday
indicates that sellers anticipate the immanent drop in market value, trying to make sure the
player is sold in time and that a sale is not inhibited by a too aggressive reserve price.
On the other hand, we ¯nd that reserve prices are too clustered as to be compatible with
fully rational behavior. In particular, the distribution of reserve prices spikes substantially at
multiples of e50 000, and also suggests a lower scale clustering at multiples of e5 000. This
is in marked contrast to standard auction theoretical results which would predict reserve
prices to be a continuous function of the hazard rate of the distribution of buyers' valuations
(see eg. Krishna, 2002). We interpret this as evidence for sellers using a round number
heuristic in setting reserve prices as the one documented in Benartzi and Thaler (2008) for
determining savings choices. The phenomenon of \price clustering" is also well documented
for stock markets, where limit sell orders and also prices tend to be rounded to whole numbers
rather than displaying fractions.3 Also, round integer clustering at multiples of 5 has been
suggested earlier (eg. Harris, 1991), resembling the frequent appearance of reserve prices at
multiples of e5 000 in our data.
Our regressions provide strong evidence that sellers fall prey to an aggravated entitlement
e®ect, closely related to another prominent bias, the sunk cost fallacy.4 In our data we
have a very good proxy whether a player on the transfer market had been acquired by
the seller previously or whether he was promoted (basically for free) from the seller's own
youth team. We ¯nd that, ceteris paribus, sellers set substantially and signi¯cantly higher
3Sonnemans (2006) provides an overview on previous studies on price clustering on stock markets and
discusses several possible explanations.
4Cf. eg. Arkes and Blumer (1985).
2reserve prices for players they have bought as compared to players they promoted internally.
They are also much more likely (by 9%) to set a positive reserve price for those players.
Hence it seems that the active purchasing of a player creates an entitlement e®ect, maybe
because sellers do not regard the price they paid as sunk.5 There is ample evidence for
the entitlement or endowment e®ect and the resulting Willingness-to-Pay/Willingness-to-
Accept gap in controlled experiments6, though recent work by Plott and Zeiler (2005, 2007)
is critical with respect to the validity of the endowment and entitlement e®ects outside the
lab. Our study provides evidence for a strong and persistent entitlement e®ect in a very
competitive natural setting. All our results are robust if we control for the experience of
the sellers in our sample. If anything, the entitlement e®ect seems to be stronger for more
experienced sellers. This could be interpreted in line with Huck, Kirchsteiger, and Oechssler
(2005) who show theoretically that evolution favors individuals whose preferences embody
an endowment e®ect. The reason is that the endowment e®ect improves the bargaining
position in bilateral trades. Translating this intuition into our setting, experienced sellers
are more prone to aggressive rent appropriation for acquired players, securing themselves a
larger share of the pie when trade is successful, and allowing them to be more successful in
the overall game.
Genesove and Mayer (2001) empirically analyze seller behavior in the Boston residential
real estate market using panel data obtained from proprietary records. In their data, sellers
whose condominium's expected selling price falls below the original purchase price due to
an aggregate market downturn tend to set asking prices well above the expected price level.
They argue that this unwillingness to accept market prices for property in the down part
of the market cycle could stem from loss aversion on behalf of the sellers. However, in
our sample there are no losses caused by business cycle swings, since all data was collected
within the period of only a fortnight. The setting studied in Genesove and Mayer (2001)
involves bargaining, where the ¯nal price can fall below the initial asking price of the seller,
which in addition not necessarily re°ects his reserve price. It is also reasonable to assume
that the evaluation of a condominium may involve substantial search costs, whereas all
relevant information on HT's virtual players is readily available, highly standardized, and
thus comparable. Hence, while we observe similar behavior of sellers, the motivations behind
it may di®er considerably.
As alluded to above, though there is to our knowledge very few other evidence on reserve
price formation, there are several studies on the e®ects of reserve prices on selling prices.
However, the evidence from those is mixed. While Ariely and Simonson (2003) and Kamins
5Though this may seem a bit far fetched there is a striking resemblance to the often heard proverb in
real world soccer that a \prophet has no honor in his own country," meaning that a player that grew up in a
club is oftentimes not as much valued there as other players that have been acquired on the transfer market.
6For references see eg. Thaler (1980), Knetsch (1989), Hanemann (1991), Shogren, Shin, Hayes, and
Kliebenstein (1994), Casey (1995) or Carmon and Ariely (2000).
3et al. (2004) ¯nd positive e®ects of reserve prices on selling prices in ¯eld data and in ¯eld
experiments, Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) and Hoppe and Sadrieh (2007) ¯nd no evidence
for reference dependence in their ¯eld study and ¯eld experiment respectively. Of particular
interest to us is the study by Trautmann and Traxler (2008), which also uses data from
auctions of virtual football players traded in HT. The focus of their study is separating
two potential channels how reserve prices might a®ect selling prices: A reference point
or anchoring e®ect as suggested in Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2007) and a standard rent
appropriation e®ect that stems from reserve prices forcing bidders to pay more than the
second highest bidders valuation. Trautmann and Traxler (2008) ¯nd a positive e®ect of
reserve prices but they ¯nd no evidence that any of these higher prices stem from a reference
point e®ect but rather most of this can be accounted for by rent appropriation, as sellers try
to set prices competitively between the highest and second highest bidders' valuations.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the structure
of the data and the relevant details of HT. Section 3 presents our empirical analysis and
its results and Section 4 concludes. All Tables and Figures are collected at the end of the
paper.
2 Data Description
HT is a browser-based free online football manager game with almost one million registered
users, henceforth referred to as \managers".7 The basic concept of the game is to manage
your own virtual football club, which consists of virtual players that are represented by a
multi-dimensional vector of attributes. The tasks for the human managers are manifold,
combining the elements of economic management, tactical options, and community interac-
tion. Alongside the sportive component of challenging the teams of other human managers,
the game requires the manager to develop a sound ¯nancial scheme for his club. The most
important source of (virtual in-game) revenue for a manager is successfully trading play-
ers on the HT transfer market. Most managers follow a \train and trade" strategy which
¯rst ensures the improvement of quality of their own virtual players by choosing a sound
training scheme and then pro¯tably trading them with other managers. Since the proceeds
from player sales are the major source of income in HT, the transfer market provides strong
incentives for the participants in this open-ended manager game.
Each player has eight abilities, his \skills", that determine his suitability to play a certain
position in the line-up.8 From the set of player attributes, only these skills can be actively
7We refer to human users as \managers", while using the term \player" to address virtual football players.
8The eight skills are labeled goalkeeping, stamina, set-pieces, playmaking, winger, scoring, passing, and
defense, and the current level is displayed as integer on range 0 to 20. To all other attributes, we will refer to
4improved by the managers via training. However, it takes several weeks for an individual
player to increase by a full skill level and only a single skill can be trained at a time. Hence,
managers have to specialize in training only one speci¯c skill, say goalkeeping. As soon
as such a keeper-trainee surpasses the threshold for a skill-up in this skill, the manager
can pro¯tably sell him to another manager and assign the free training slot to a new (and
younger) trainee, which he can either acquire on the transfer market or promote directly
from his own youth team.9 The proceeds from the sales are in turn used to ¯nance the club.
The selling mechanism implemented on the transfer market is an English ascending open
bid auction. When selling a player, managers can specify a non-negative reserve price and
select a line-up category for the player (e.g. goalkeeper). An auction ends exactly 72 hours
from submission, but the deadline is automatically extended by 3 minutes if a bid is placed
within 3 minutes to the deadline. This continues until all bidders but one retire.10 All players
on sale are displayed in the same standardized way and the sellers have no possibility to a®ect
the way how an individual player is presented to potential buyers. A prospective buyer has to
submit a bid at least equal to the reserve price or above the current highest bid, respectively.
After the auction ends, the player is automatically transferred to the winning manager's team
and the seller receives the winning bid net of some small fee.11 If a player received no bid, the
auction fails and he stays with the seller. Importantly, and in clear contrast to other internet
auction platforms, when HT players are on the market, all relevant information concerning
their quality - that is the full attribute vector - becomes publicly available. Hence, at the
time of sale there is no information asymmetry between buyers and sellers and, for that
matter, the econometrician.
The market value of a player to a large extent depends on his current skill levels. In
combination with his form and health status, they determine the strength a player adds to
a team if he is currently lined-up in a certain position for a match, which we de¯ne for the
purpose of this paper as his \consumption value" (CV). For instance, a keepers' CV in HT
is almost exclusively driven by the goalkeeping-skill. However, the market value is in addi-
tion a®ected through a second channel, which we will call in this paper the \Advancement
Potential" (AP) of a player. While the consumption component is independent of a player's
age, the AP value strongly depends on the fact that age is a key determinant for training
as \traits" or \characteristics" throughout the paper. A typical player pro¯le with the full set of attributes
and the corresponding auction details can be seen in Figure 5 in the Appendix.
9Each manager can promote one player from the youth team each week, whose attributes are determined
randomly with a high probability of low skills. Age is also randomly assigned on the interval 17 to 19 years.
10Given the reserve price is set below the second highest bidder's valuation, the transfer price will equal
the second-highest bid plus one discrete increment, i.e. the format is equivalent to a second-price auction.
For reference on the e®ects of the employed ending rule on bidding behavior see eg. Roth and Ockenfels
(2002) and Ariely et. al (2005).
11The fee is proportional to the transfer price and declines with the time a player is member of the team
with a minimum of 2% after 112 real-time days (an HT year). These transaction costs are small and do not
a®ect any of our results.
5e®ectiveness. In HT, the marginal skill-improvement from training declines with the age of
a player.12 The younger a player, the more he bene¯ts ceteris paribus from training and the
faster he advances to a higher skill level, with which in turn his CV increases. As a conse-
quence, a viable training strategy necessarily requires rather young players, since they have
the highest innate potential for further skill development. However, a player who is just a
few days younger than another - being otherwise identical - should not be worth much more,
since the di®erence in their AP is minimal. This remains true, even if the one player already
turned a year older while the other's birthday lies just ahead. All else equal, a player's AP
value decreases continuously with his age measured in days.
Our main interest in this paper is to explain how sellers choose their reserve prices. For
this purpose, we focus on a speci¯c subgroup of players: We collected all publicly available
information on 6 258 virtual players aged between seventeen - the youngest age possible in
the game - and nineteen years, all listed as goalkeepers on HT's transfer market. Moreover,
all players display the same skill level in goalkeeping (score 6 out of 20), which is the only
important skill for a goalie.13 By exclusively restricting our sample to this subgroup of
players, we create partial homogeneity. As with the goalkeeping-skill the most in°uential
determinant of the CV is kept constant, we can regard the whole CV as virtually constant
in our data. We are thus able to identify variations of players' APs in the sample, which
crucially depend on their age, or more precisely, their total age measured in units of days.
The game design is such that all relevant information on the players age attribute is readily
available and explicitly stated to every potential bidder.
Next to all relevant player and auction characteristics, we also collected information on
buyers and sellers. For a subsample of 2 411 auctions we are able to construct a proxy for
seller nd buyer experience as we use the information on how a manager ranks relative to all
other managers within a given country. We argue that a higher ranking within a country
is a good indicator for being more experienced as a higher ranking can only be achieved
by playing the game for a long period of time and/or being very successful quickly, which
should to a large degree be correlated with having routine playing the game.
Furthermore we use the information whether a player plays abroad or not, indicated by a
20% bonus on his wage,14 as a proxy whether he had been previously traded or whether he
is a \fresh" player from the seller's own youth team. Fresh players never receive this 20%
12Importantly, the marginal e®ect of training is otherwise homogenous for all virtual players, i.e. there
exists nothing like a talent-attribute capturing the potential for skill-improvements. It does, however, to
some extent depend on the current skill level (which we hold constant in our sample), the ability of the
club's trainer, and the training intensity chosen by the manager, where the latter two give rise to variation
in private valuations.
13In contrast to goalkeepers, the values of other types of players crucially depend on more than one skill
and in addition also on the individual line-up tactics of a manager, making an analysis of the driving forces
behind the market value substantially more di±cult.
14Note that a player's wage is exogenously ¯xed by HT and cannot be in°uenced by the managers.
6playing-abroad bonus on their wages, as e.g. German teams always produce fresh German
players. As in roughly 85% of all trades buyer and seller are not from the same country, our
potential mistake from missing trades within a country is small and this 20% bonus is a very
good proxy to discriminate between fresh and previously traded players.
3 Analysis and Results
Our dataset consists of 6 258 players with identical goalkeeper-skill that were posted on HT's
transfer market between November 18, 2007 and December 02, 2007.15 Table 1 shows the
summary statistics of the most important variables in our sample. The mean reserve price
(\askprice") in our sample was e77 537, but levels as high as e579 000 were reached. Note
that the ¯nal prices fall in a comparable range, indicating that by and large the reserve prices
were not set beside the point. A year in HT is normalized to 112 real-time days and the age
of a player is displayed in the form \X years and Y days" on his pro¯le-page. Hence, years
de¯nes the age-group of a player, while days discloses information on the distance to the
next higher age-level, or equivalently, how far his next birthday is away. For our empirical
estimation, we construct the measure totalage 2 [0,335], which combines all information
contained in both of these two variables and displays the total age of player in day units.16
**********************************************************
Table 1 - Summary Statistics
**********************************************************
Panel B of Table 1 shows some statistics on the frequency of data. Note that all age-groups
are roughly equally represented, with a slight majority of players aged nineteen. According
to our wage-bonus proxy (indicated by the dummy dbonus), in about 32% of all auctions
the sellers o®ered players they previously bought themselves on the market. In 68% of the
times a player promoted from the own youth squad of the seller, i.e. a \fresh" player, was
auctioned o®. For 5 108 players in our sample the sellers ¯xed a strictly positive reserve
price. 4 743 of all players were sold, where in 756 cases the trade took place at a price equal
to the minimum bid (single bidder case). The fact that a substantial fraction of players
remained unsold is evidence that reserve prices were set competitively.
15We started out with a total sample of 6 460 auctions comprising all the auctions of players in the
relevant age and skill group in that period. From this we dropped 4 players that play for their respective
home country's national team, 66 players with reserve prices identi¯ed as outliers by Grubbs' test (Grubbs,
1969) and 132 players that were injured at the time of the auction. This leaves us with 6 258 players or
96.9% of the initial sample.
16The variable is calculated as totalage = 112¢(years-17)+ days. Hence, the minimum value of totalage at
0 re°ects age "17 years and 0 days" and the maximum value at 335 stands for "19 years and 111 days".
7The \Birthday-E®ect". In our earlier work on the demand side of HT's transfer market,
we ¯nd strong evidence for a discontinuous relation between the selling price and age. Hence,
it seems a natural point to start our analysis of the driving forces in the formation of reserve
prices by similarly examining the relation of reserve price and total age. Intuitively, the
variable totalage captures all available information on the players' age attribute, and, as
we have argued above, ceteris paribus the value of a player should decline gradually as
totalage increases. However, Figure 1 reveals that the relation between reserve price and
total age is not smooth but exhibits striking discontinuities where the players enter the
next higher age-group. This ¯nding exactly resembles the \birthday e®ect" we document
in Englmaier and SchmÄ oller (2008) for the ¯nal selling prices in HT. There, we argue that
buyers overweigh the informational content of the age-group indicator years, while they
under-use the ¯ner information on a players age attribute given in form of the variable days,
leading to suboptimal bidding behavior.
**********************************************************
Figure 1 - Relation of Reserve Price and Total Age in Days
**********************************************************
Appropriation of Buyer Surplus. Since most managers in HT alternate between both
roles, it seems not too surprising to ¯nd similar behavioral patterns for buyers and sellers.
At a ¯rst glance, it stands to reason that the sellers fall prey to the same suboptimal use of
information as the buyers do. However, it is also possible that it is the bias on the demand
side that actually triggers the observed choice of reserve prices. That would be the case
if at least some sellers follow strategic considerations and try to exploit the biased buyers.
To understand whether this is indeed the case, ¯rst note that in 15.9% of the successful
trades there was a single bidder only and the winning bid equaled the reserve price (Panel
B of Table 1). Building upon the interpretation in Trautmann and Traxler (2008), we take
it that in these 756 auctions the sellers successfully managed to appropriate some of the
highest bidder's surplus. By setting the reserve price between the latter's and the second
highest bidder's valuation, the selling price is mechanically higher than if there was no
minimum bid. Furthermore, at least some of the 24% failed auctions are likely to result
from some sellers following this strategy of \rent appropriation" too aggressively and set
their reserve price above even the highest bidder's valuation. In line with this argument, a
non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test con¯rms that the askprices for unsold players
are signi¯cantly higher than those for successful trades (p-value=0.000). Though merely
inferred by inspection, we take these observations as a ¯rst indication that at least some
sellers behave strategically and try to reap some of the buyers' surplus.
8**********************************************************
Figure 2 - Age Distribution of Sold and Unsold Players
**********************************************************
An analysis of the age distribution of o®ered players further strengthens this intuition.
Figure 2 depicts the age distribution (measured in day units) for the full sample, sold and
unsold players separately. The dashed lines at 112 and 224 mark the points where the players
turn eighteen and nineteen, respectively. We ¯nd a clustering of sale o®ers about three weeks
before players turn one year older, indicating that sellers rationally want to sell players before
they drop in value due to the \birthday e®ect". Most intriguingly, at about 90 days of total
age both the total number of o®ers and the number of failed auctions increase substantially,
while the number of sales (and also the selling price pattern) remains largely constant.17 At
the same time, in Figure 1 the median askprice exhibits a local peak at exactly the same
age level, though this latter ¯nding is not statistically signi¯cant. Apparently the sellers are
most aggressive in their \rent appropriation" strategy for players that are about to turn one
year older and therefore they often exceed the maximum willingness to pay of any potential
bidder and fail in their attempt to reap the surplus.
**********************************************************
Figure 3 - Reserve Prices in Close Proximity to Discontinuity Point
**********************************************************
However, in even closer proximity to the day of birthday, a di®erent picture arises, as Figure
3 shows. It depicts all reserve prices two weeks before and after the eighteenth birthday of
players (totalage 2 [98;125]). Observe that the median reserve price begins to decline at
110 days of total age and drops to zero at 112, while it moves upwards again immediately
after the birthday. Evidentially, many sellers seem to be aware of the value loss that arises
through the \birthday e®ect" and hence try to avoid to bear it themselves. Consequently,
they charge low minimum bids for players whose birthday is imminent, thereby minimizing
the risk that they remain unsold.
Round number heuristic. Though the above ¯ndings point towards rather sophisticated
seller behavior, we also ¯nd contrasting evidence. For a start, reserve prices are too clustered
as to be compatible with fully rational behavior. In particular, Figure 4 clearly shows that
the distribution of reserve prices spikes at multiples of e50 000 (Figure 4a), but also at
multiples of e5 000 (Figure 4b). This ¯nding stands in marked contrast to standard auction
17We ¯nd similar, but less pronounced e®ects at around 200 and 315 days of age, i.e. the 19th and 20th
birthday.
9theory which would predict reserve prices to be a continuous function of the hazard rate of
the distribution of buyers' valuations (see eg. Krishna, 2002). We interpret this as evidence
that sellers follow a rule of thumb to considerably simplify their decision making. Our
intuition is that they are using a round number heuristic in setting reserve prices as the
one documented in Benartzi and Thaler (2008) for determining savings choices. According
to Sonnemans (2006), this sort of large scale round number-clustering could be caused by
boundedly rational sellers, who form mental target prices, which then serve as a \good
enough"-solution in their view instead of demanding the true market value. Note that
especially in the light of a rent appropriation strategy as proposed by Trautmann and Traxler
(2008) this makes very little sense as this strategy depends on very ¯ne tuned estimates of
the distribution of valuations.
**********************************************************
Figure 4 - Patterns and Distribution of Reserve Prices
**********************************************************
Evidence on entitlement e®ects. Moreover, we ¯nd striking evidence that reserve prices
strongly di®er whether or not a player has been purchased or was instead drafted from a
seller's own youth squad. First, among the players that were bought (dbonus=1) the share of
failed auctions (32.6%) is substantially higher than that for fresh players (20.3%). Pearson's
chi-square test con¯rms that there is a statistically signi¯cant relationship between dbonus
and the frequency of players remaining unsold (p-value: 0.000). While in principle this could
result from a preference for fresh players on behalf of the buyers,18 we ¯nd strong evidence
that sellers chose signi¯cantly higher minimum bids for players they acquired on the market.
For instance, the mean reserve price for fresh players at e66 320 is substantially below the
mean we observe for acquired players at e101 331. This di®erence is statistically signi¯cant
on the highest level (non-parametric Mann-Whitney two-sample ranksum, p-value = 0.0000).
Apparently, sellers become attached to acquired players and hence demand a premium to
give them away again. Stated di®erently, our ¯ndings indicate that sellers in HT exhibit
some form of entitlement e®ect with respect to players they bought on the market, but not
for those players they promoted from their own youth squad.
To provide statistical backup for our ¯ndings, we employ multi-variate regression analyses
with askprice as the dependent variable. Because some of the players with a positive reserve
price were not sold, we have a censored sample. We address this by using a Tobit model with
left censored reserve price records at value zero in addition to standard OLS with robust
18In Englmaier and SchmÄ oller (2008) we ¯nd such a tendency of the buyers, but the e®ect is of small
magnitude and there is a rational interpretation for a discount on purchased players: A fresh player may be
close to the next skill level whereas a previously traded and trained player is more likely to be sold directly
after a skill-up. Conversely, for sellers there is no such plausible rationale.
10standard errors for all speci¯cations. All results from the OLS regression remain robust
without any attenuation. The results from both approaches are shown in Table 2.
**********************************************************
Table 2 - Multivariate Regression - Determinants of Reserve Price
**********************************************************
The ¯rst and the fourth column of Table 2 contain the coe±cients from the simplest speci-
¯cations we analyzed (OLS I and TOBIT I), using only a subset of the explanatory variables
at hand. Remember that the measure totalage by construction represents all available in-
formation on the age attribute of a player. Conversely, the age-group dummies agegroup18
and agegroup19 only re°ect the noisier information contained in the variable years.19 There-
fore, the latter should all be redundant once we include totalage as explanatory variable.
However, the coe±cients of agegroup18 and agegroup19 both are of stunning magnitude and
highly signi¯cant. By the day players turn eighteen, in model OLS I the expected reserve
price slumps down by an average of e88 529 (e92 706 in TOBIT I) with 99% statistically
signi¯cant t-statistics. At their nineteenth birthday, players experience another value loss
of roughly e11 000, the di®erence between the coe±cients of the age-group dummies, or
about 18% relative to the mean askprice for age-group eighteen (e56 399). A chi-square
test approves that both coe±cients are jointly signi¯cant and also statistically di®erent from
each other (p-value=0.000 in OLS I and p-value= 0.012 in TOBIT I). Hence, both regression
models con¯rm that the \birthday e®ect" is also present in reserve prices.
We also ¯nd indications for sophistication in the seller behavior. In any speci¯cation, at
least one out of two (correlated) quality indicators has a signi¯cant positive relation with
askprice. The variables wage and total skill index both are noisy signals of where between
the current and the next higher skill-level the player is located, and are correlated at rate
½=0.597.20 For instance, in model OLS I (TOBIT I) the expected reserve price changes by
e20.43 (e20.11) for each unit increase in total skill index. While the current form is rather
volatile and directly a®ects the player's performance in matches, it is also correlated with
the total skill index (½=0.495). As we would expect, all three variables are positively related
19Instead of directly including the variable years we use dummies to indicate the age-group, because our
analysis in Englmaier and SchmÄ oller (2008) shows that the e®ect of a birthday is non-constant across age-
groups. Additionally, we include the square of totalage in the estimation model rather than the absolute
values to allow for a stronger than linear relationship between the total age (in day units) and the reserve
price. All results remain robust if we use a linear speci¯cation and/or include years directly.
20Since the characteristic wage of the players in our sample is small relative to the observed (reserve)
prices, the cost aspect of wage becomes negligible. At the same time, in HT a higher wage ceteris paribus
signals that a player is closer to experience a level-up in one of his skills. Hence, the positive sign of the
coe±cient for wage is plausible.
11to the level of the reserve price, even though the in°uence is sometimes not signi¯cant across
speci¯cations.21
Most intriguingly, the fact whether a player was acquired or promoted internally from the
youth squad has a tremendous impact on the choice of the reserve price. As indicated by
a large and highly signi¯cant coe±cient of dbonus, the expected reserve price on average
increases by e25 815 in OLS I (e31 449 in TOBIT I) if a player was previously purchased
by the seller. We have similar results in models OLS II and TOBIT II, in which we add
the full player attribute vector into the regression, including all skills except goalkeeping,
which is identical for all players. We also control for potential auction end day and end time
e®ects adding a dummy for each weekday, and dummies for evening and night hours.22 All
important in°uential coe±cients from the previous speci¯cation remain at the same order
of magnitude and are still highly signi¯cant. From the skills, only the positive in°uence
of stamina on the reserve price is highly signi¯cant. Again, this ¯nding points towards
sophisticated seller behavior since stamina is to some extent in°uential for a goalkeeper's
performance.
In the models OLS III and TOBIT III we maintain the full control speci¯cation, but only
consider experienced sellers (sellerxp < 0.2) to control for possible learning e®ects.23 We
observe that the \birthday e®ect" is clearly present also among expert sellers as indicated
by the large and signi¯cant coe±cients of the age-group dummies, though the coe±cient for
agegroup19 is no longer statistically di®erent from that for agegroup18. Furthermore, also
the entitlement e®ect remains robust with experienced sellers. If anything, it seems that the
impact of dbonus gets even more pronounced.
Moreover, if a player was previously traded, we ¯nd that only in 9.88% of the cases the
reserve price was set to zero. Among fresh players with 20.27% this share is more than twice
as large. As a robustness check, we use logit models to estimate the likelihood for a positive
reserve price.24 In this speci¯cation the dependent variable is dask, a dummy of value 0 or
1 on whether or not there was a positive minimum bid. The results from these regressions
are shown in Table 3.
21To account for the problem of multicollinearity, we ran diagnostics on the variance in°ation factor. The
co-movement between the variables turns out to be unproblematic and we keep all three variables in the
estimation model. All results remain robust if we drop one or more of them.
22We ¯nd that for players with a nicer character and more experience a higher askprice is demanded.
Moreover, the sellers seem to react to demand °uctuations on the transfer market. For instance, at night
hours, where less potential bidders are online simultaneously, we document a signi¯cant positive impact on
the minimum bid. Since these e®ects are of secondary order and do not con°ict with our main results, the
respective coe±cients are not displayed in Table 2 to ease the exposition. The full regression tables can be
requested from the authors.
23The proxy sellerxp takes values on the interval [0,1] and is calculated by dividing the seller's position
in the national ranking through the total number of active managers in same country. Using sellerxp < 0.2
leaves us with a bit less than the 30% most experienced sellers in the subsample where we can construct the
experience dummy.
24Using a probit model yields virtually identical results.
12**********************************************************
Table 3 - Logit Regression - Likelihood of Non-Zero Reserve Price
**********************************************************
The ¯rst two columns (Logit I) show the odds ratios (exponentiated coe±cients) and
the corresponding marginal e®ects (instantaneous change) in the probability when only the
main variables are used as regressors. The regression establishes evidence that a previous
acquisition increases the expected likelihood of a non-zero askprice. The dummy agegroup18
and the previous-trade-proxy dbonus are statistically signi¯cant on the highest level. In other
words, the likelihood for a strictly positive reserve price decreases if a player turns eighteen.
Conversely, the e®ect of dbonus on the likelihood for a non-zero reserve price is large and
positive: For a purchased player (dbonus = 1) the odds of a strictly positive reserve price
(versus a zero reserve price) increases by a factor of 2.3 as compared to a player that was
promoted from a manager's own youth team. In terms of the marginal e®ect, a non-zero
reserve price is 11 percent more likely for previously acquired players.25 If we again employ
the full vector of player and auction attributes as controls (Logit II), all results remain
qualitatively robust. In line with our previous results, a separate regression for expert sellers
(Logit III) reveals that, if anything, the e®ect is more pronounced for experts.
Hence, if a player was bought rather than promoted, on average not only the absolute level
of the reserve price is higher, but also the likelihood that it is set di®erent from zero at all.
Both ¯ndings suggest that the sellers are prone to an aggravated entitlement e®ect for players
that they purchased on the market beforehand, but not if a player was promoted from their
own youth team. Since the managers in HT engage in a highly competitive environment this
result is even more startling, since it is an common argument that such entitlement e®ects
vanish if competition gets more intense (see e.g. Plott and Zeiler, 2007) or of goods are
purchased for resale (see e.g. Kahnemann, 2003).
4 Conclusion
We examine empirically how managers playing the online game HT set reserve prices in
auctions for virtual players. Using detailed ¯eld data on 6 258 auctions from HT's transfer
market, we ¯nd that chosen reserve prices exhibit both, very sophisticated and "irrational"
behavior by the sellers. Reserve Prices pick up the "birthday e®ect" in sales prices, doc-
umented in Englmaier and SchmÄ oller (2008) and are adjusted remarkably nuanced to the
resulting sales price pattern.
25The marginal change is the partial derivative of the predicted probability w.r.t. an independent variable.
13Evidentially, while many sellers act strategically and try to reap some of the buyers'
surplus, some fail in this endeavor as they set reserve prices too aggressively. In addition,
we have established that reserve prices are too clustered (around e50 000 steps) as to be
consistent with fully rational behavior. Most intriguingly, even though HT's transfer market
is highly competitive, we ¯nd strong evidence for an entitlement e®ect in form of a huge
positive e®ect on the reserve price when a player has been acquired previously. All our
results are robust when we control for the experience of sellers, and the auction-end-day and
time-of-day e®ects. Hence we conclude that HT managers simplify their decision making
by adopting heuristic pricing rules that are suboptimal from a fully rational point of view.
In particular, the strong entitlement e®ect we document most plausibly is a rami¯cation of
psychological motivations like the sunk cost fallacy or loss aversion. Abstracting from skill-
improvements for the moment, for any purchased player a seller may always use the paid
price as a direct benchmark. Though this cost is sunk by then, sellers might be tempted
to charge at least the same amount, or even an additional mark-up, as reserve price. Since
however their valuation was the highest in the previous auction, this might be too high a
threshold. For promoted players, in contrast, there is no such benchmark to anchor upon.
If, as in our data, this entitlement e®ect is persistent and quantitatively relevant, the option
of choosing a reserve price might be an impediment to market e±ciency as sellers set too
high reserve prices resulting in too little trade. In such situations the social planner might
want to avoid using a reserve price in the design of an auction format to avoid this potential
distortion. On the upside, our paper suggests that simple microeconomic theory gives us a
lot of mileage in explaining market behavior in complex environments. We document that
(the majority of) sellers very ¯nely adjust their behavior to demand patterns and try to
strategically exploit potential arbitrage possibilities.
Games like HT, where people strategically interact, not only attract increasing numbers of
customers, but also create new markets and business ideas. We are convinced that the vast
amount of data generated by social gaming involving thousands of motivated online gamers
provides a fruitful source for valuable insights and can contribute to the analysis of human
decision making.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A. Panel B.
Variable Mean Min Max Variable Value Frequency Percent
askprice 77537 0 579000 age distribution (years = 17) 1886 30.14
price
a 81459 0 634000 (years = 18) 1935 30.92
years 18 17 19 (years = 19) 2437 38.94
days 59 0 111
totalage
b 181 3 335 fresh players (dbonus = 0) 4253 67.96
total skill index 1994 650 3240 purchased players (dbonus = 1) 2005 32.04
wage 1884 770 2676
form 6 1 8 reserve price (askprice > 0) 5108 81.62
stamina 3 1 9 no reserve price (askprice = 0) 1150 18.38
passing 1 1 4
playmaking 1 1 3 successful trades (price > 0) 4743 75.79
scoring 1 1 3 players unsold (price = 0) 1515 24.21
winger 1 1 4
setpieces 2 1 7 sold at reserve price (price=askprice) 756 15.94
defense 1 1 4 (of all sold)
a. A Price of zero indicates a failed auction. The minimum price among all successful trades was e19 000.
b. The measure for total age is calculated as totalage = 112¢(years-17)+ days. It displays a players age in day units and
is normalized such that the minimum value of totalage at 0 re°ects age "17 years and 0 days" and the maximum value
at 335 stands for "19 years and 111 days".
Table 2: Multivariate Regression - Determinants of Reserve Price
OLS I OLS II OLS III Tobit I Tobit II Tobit III
no controls expert sellers no controls expert sellers
agegroup18 -88529.73*** -88663.06*** -87625.39*** -92706.27*** -92923.12*** -95038.57***
(2720.41) (2730.02) (7835.08) (3099.74) (3095.09) (9367.06)
agegroup19 -99150.27*** -97663.81*** -89941.40*** -103822.60*** -101995.20*** -97106.86***
(3992.42) (4032.39) (12021.47) (6100.97) (6072.99) (19234.19)
totalage
2 -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.27** -0.16** -0.18** -0.34
(0.04) (0.04) (0.13) (0.07) (0.07) (0.24)
total skill index 20.43*** 20.17*** 18.71 20.11*** 19.57*** 28.06*
(4.92) (4.82) (17.21) (4.45) (4.42) (16.26)
wage 17.45** 18.49** 22.94 19.65*** 21.72*** 21.47
(7.88) (7.74) (30.74) (7.01) (7.02) (28.97)
form -2767.89** -1276.34 -1564.55 -3165.42*** -1175.64 -1060.93
(1203.09) (1247.10) (3643.78) (1218.45) (1253.45) (3848.84)
acquired 25815.38*** 21127.71*** 39040.31*** 31448.75*** 25114.21*** 50265.09***
(dbonus=1) (2964.97) (3076.64) (11143.74) (2834.87) (2958.61) (12155.47)
skills no yes yes no yes yes
daytime no yes yes no yes yes
weekday no yes yes no yes yes
character no yes yes no yes yes
R
2 0.38 0.39 0.46
N 6258 6258 748 6258 6258 748
(1150 left-cens.) (1150 left-cens.) (181 left-cens.)
Notes: Standard errors are stated in parentheses (robust for OLS). Asterisks denote statistical signi¯cance at the 1%(***),
5%(**) or 10%(*) level. Sellers are classi¯ed as experts if sellerxp<0.2. \Skills" captures the playing abilities except of
\goalkeeping" (= constant at score 6). \Character" contains all other player attributes. \Daytime" and \weekday" indicate
whether dummies for daytime and day of the week were included.
17Table 3: Logit Regression - Likelihood of Non-Zero Reserve Price
Logit I Logit II Logit III
no controls expert sellers
Odds Rt. Marg.Efct. Odds Rt. Marg.Efct. Odds Rt. Marg.Efct.
agegroup18 0.675*** -0.0559 0.681*** -0.053 0.539** -0.1001
(0.074) (0.076) (0.160)
agegroup19 0.708* -0.049 0.760 -0.038 0.632 -0.0743
(0.143) (0.156) (0.358)
totalage2 1.000 0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
total skill index 1.000 0 1.000 0.000 1.001 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
wage 1.000 0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
form 0.966 -0.0049 1.037 0.005 1.131 0.0199
(0.043) (0.049) (0.144)
acquired 2.322*** 0.1197 1.882*** 0.088 5.057*** 0.2622
(dbonus=1) (0.266) (0.230) (2.422)
skills no yes yes
daytime no yes yes
weekday no yes yes
character no yes yes
N 6258 6258 748
Notes: For each speci¯cation the respective odds ratio and marginal e®ect for the regressors used to
predict dask are shown. Standard errors are stated in parentheses (robust for OLS). Asterisks denote sta-
tistical signi¯cance at the 1%(***), 5%(**) or 10%(*) level. Sellers are classi¯ed as experts if sellerxp<0.2.
Groups of controls identical to those in Table 2.
Table 4: List of Variables
Variable Description Range
Player attributes years Age-group of player 17 - 19
days Days of age / distance to next higher age-level 0 - 112
totalage Total age in day units (normalized) 0 - 335
form Current form of player 0 - 8
total skill index Noisy indicator for overall quality of player N
wage Salary (exogenous; in virtual Euro) N
cohort Age in week intervals 1 - 48
stamina Playing skill for all player types 0 - 20
setpieces Playing skill for all player types 0 - 20
keeper Playing skill, position speci¯c 0 - 20
playmaking Playing skill, position speci¯c 0 - 20
winger Playing skill, position speci¯c 0 - 20
scoring Playing skill, position speci¯c 0 - 20
passing Playing skill, position speci¯c 0 - 20
defense Playing skill, position speci¯c 0 - 20
agreeability High value if agreeable person (ascending order) 0 - 5
aggression Low value if player aggressive (descending order) 0 - 4
honesty High value if honest person (ascending order) 0 - 5
plrexp Experience of player 0 - 20
ldrshp Leadership qualities of player 0 - 7
gtotal Number of goals scored by player N
Auction Data askprice Reserve price chosen by seller N
price Price paid by buyer if sold N
dtime Time of deadline hh.mm.ss
dday Day of deadline dd.mm.yy
buyerexp Buyer's rank relative to all other managers in same country 0 - 1
sellerxp Seller's rank relative to all other managers in same country 0 - 1
Dummy variables deve Was player sold between 4 p.m. - 0 a.m.? f0,1g
(1=yes, 0=no) dnight Was player was sold between 0 a.m. - 8 a.m.? f0,1g
dmon - dsun On which day does the auction end? f0,1g
dask Was the reserve price di®erent from zero? f0,1g
dbonus Is away-bonus on wage present? (proxy for previous sale) f0,1g
intracountry Were buyer and seller from same country? f0,1g
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Notes: The measure for total age in days is calculated as totalage = 112¢(years-17)+ days. It is
normalized such that the minimum value of totalage at 0 re°ects age "17 years and 0 days" and the
maximum value at 335 stands for "19 years and 111 days".
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Notes: The ¯gure depicts all reserve prices for players two weeks before and after their eighteens
birthday at totalage=112, i.e. totalage 2 [98;125] overall including 498 observations.
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(b) Frequency of forth-to-last digit of Reserve Pricesb
a. The ¯gure depicts the frequency of strictly positive reserve prices. The pattern clearly clusters around multiples of e50 000.
b. This histogram shows the frequency distribution of the fourth-to-last digit (the \thousands"-digit) of the (non-zero) reserve
prices in the sample. For example, if askprice is e67 000 the digit takes value \7". The spikes at the values of 0, 5 and 9
indicate that a majority of reserve prices were set at multiples of e5 000, or just below the next full ten-thousand.
20Figure 5: Screenshot of Player Pro¯le with Auction Details
Notes: The ¯gure shows the typical pro¯le for a player on sale. Next to his full attribute vector, on the lower right all
information regarding the auction details are displayed. The seller of this goalkeeper set him on the transfer market during
the afternoon on June 23, 2008 (i.e. exactly 72 hours before the deadline displayed) at a reserve price of e25 000. Unless no
other manager submitted a higher amount before the deadline ended, the then-current highest bid of e26 000 will have won
the auction. (Source: www.hattrick.org)
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